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Nationalisation and Privatisation: Two Industry Development Tendencies

Nationalisation and Privatisation: Two Industry Development Tendencies

Experts have been saying in the last few years that state capitalism is being developed in Russia which allegedly began with the oil and gas industry. An opinion can often be encountered that Putin’s reign has become an era of nationalisation. Meanwhile, it is hardly worthwhile evaluating the situation with property in the oil and gas sector with so little space for ambiguity. One has indeed seen the nationalisation of Yukos assets, but one has also seen an IPO of Rosneft, growth in foreign owners’ share of Gazprom, and the privatisation of SIBUR which is currently in full swing. Remember also that Putin’s presidency began with privatisation deals, for example the sale of Slavneft.

Most probably, the problem is subtler. It is not ruled out that the nationalisation stage has been but a part of a larger-scale process wherein the Putin elites are gaining control of property in the oil and gas sector. This in turn cannot be achieved without the final privatisation of the most important assets. For this is the only way to insure the property against political risks.

Private property and political stability are the two elements of the long-term project for change of the sector owners. Curiously enough, the two stages of the Putin plan have overlapped: nationalisation is still in progress, but privatisation is also in full swing.

All these issues will be dealt with in the new Report. It will cover in details the following topics:

  • «Oil and gas magnets»

    • Whom assets are registered to and what companies are the winners in the Putin-sponsored nationalisation of the industry
    • Slices of the oil and gas pie gained by Rosneft, Gazprom, and Gazprom Neft
    • Surgutneftegas as the first private company of the new political model
  • Potential victims

    • Which companies risk changing hands to the benefit of the Putin-supervised clans of bureaucrats and politicians
    • Survival strategies for TNK-BP, Lukoil, RussNeft, Bashneft, and Tatneft
  • Wars for assets

    • Showdowns between the Putin-controlled clans over the property they gain
    • Conflict over SIBUR and Gazprom’s oilfield licences and showdowns over offshore licences
  • Extraction privatisation

    • Beginning of the privatisation of state-owned assets
    • Privatisation of Gazprombank and a number of other Gazprom units
    • Transfer of state-owned fields to Gazprom and Rosneft as a latent form of privatisation
    • Future of Rosneftegaz
  • Medium-term forecast of developments

The contents of the report:

Introduction. Main Stages of Putin’s Policy on Oil and Gas Sector Property 2
Chapter 1. «Oil and Gas Magnets» 5
Gazprom: Still the Favourite 5
First Front: Undistributed Stock. Expansion to the East 7
Rosneft: in Pursuit of the Leader 16
Gazprom Neft: Getting Ready for an Independent Voyage 20
Chapter 2. Completion of the Nationalisation Stage 24
RussNeft 31
Tatneft and Bashneft 34
Chapter 3. War for Production 38
Chapter 4. Privatisation of What Has Been Nationalised 47
Privatisation of Rosneft 51
Chapter 5. Future of the Oil and Gas Aristocracy 54

Date of issue September 15, 2008


If you are interested to obtain please contact » Elena Kim

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New OPEC+ Deal and Future of Oil Business in Russia
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Regulation of Oil and Gas Sector in 2019 and Prospects for 2020
Fiscal Policy on Oil and Gas Sector: Revised as Often as Wikipedia
The tax system in the oil and gas sector continues to undergo radical changes. The beginning of 2019 saw the introduction of a new tax regime: additional income tax. That experiment was supposed to start migration of the oil industry to an innovative principle of taxation: on profit, not revenue. It seemed that a new main road was found. In the same year, however, the Finance Ministry launched an overt offensive against AIT. The fear of loss of government revenue now is more powerful than the threat of causing oil production to collapse in the medium term because of a tax system that does not stimulate investment. The Finance Ministry would strongly prefer to speed up the tax manoeuvre completion that earns the state budget additional money. Oil and gas companies respond to this with individual lobbying, attempting to wangle special treatment for their projects.
Ukrainian Gas Hub: Climax at Hand
The “zero hour” comes in less than a month: the contracts for gas transit through Ukraine and for supplying Russian gas to the country terminate at 10 am on 1 January. Meanwhile, Gazprom and Naftogaz are very far from looking for a mutually acceptable solution. The entire European gas business is watching intently the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Everyone is waiting for a new “gas war”: the January 2009 events proved to be a serious test both to European consumers and to Gazprom as a supplier. Is there still a chance of agreement? If there is not, will Gazprom cope with its obligations to deliver gas to Europe? Is Russia bluffing as it assures that the new infrastructure and gas in underground storage facilities will enable it to get by without Ukrainian transit even as soon as this winter? What will happen to Ukraine itself at the beginning of 2020?

All reports for: 2015 , 14 , 13 , 12 , 11 , 10 , 09 , 08 , 07

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