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Anti-Crisis Policy in the Oil and Gas Sector And Its Consequences

Anti-Crisis Policy in the Oil and Gas Sector And Its Consequences

The oil and gas sector is learning to operate in new realities. Production at traditional deposits in Western Siberia is declining requiring additional investments. Eastern Siberian fields are in fact green fields located far away from the existing transportation infrastructure. Offshore projects need both money and technologies. Competition on international markets is growing. Oil prices are comfortable but not as high as in mid 2008. Meanwhile, the taxation system is still designed to withdraw windfall revenues from the sector.

As a result, Vladimir Putin is facing a necessity to decide on the role the oil and gas industry should play. The selection of anti-crisis measures in the sector depends on that. If the oil and gas industry is just a source of budget revenues, its taxation should be toughened, which will inevitably lead to a fast and sharp drop in production. If the sector is considered the economy’s locomotive, one has to think about its development. But in this case there is a question about the revenue shortfall. If the oil and gas sector is a source of cheap fuel ensuring competitive advantages of other industries, one has to think about wise combination of fiscal and tariff policies.

Different roles Vladimir Putin plays result in some chaos in managing the sector. In particular, on one side, he deals quite willingly with Gazprom’s development. But on the other side, the company is interested in raising domestic gas prices by ensuring equal profitability of exports and supplies to the domestic market. However, this will be a serious blow to the Russian industry Putin is responsible for being the prime minister.

The report will elaborate on the following issues:

  • New taxation policy in the oil and gas industry

    • The necessity to invest in new production areas has already made the government introduce some novelties in the oil sector taxation. This includes a zero royalty at new deposits, changes in this tax calculation formula and a zero tax on exports from Eastern Siberian fields. But the key issue is how efficient and sufficient these measures are. And what will the upcoming novelties, e.g. replacing the royalty with an extra revenue tax, result in?
    • Another important question concerns prospects of changes in the gas sector taxation
  • Choosing between long-term and short-term tasks

    • The problem of promotion of different types of investment policies in the sector
    • Political decisions regarding the role of the oil and gas sector in the future economy
    • Proposed reforms and their administrative meaning
  • Non-residents in the industry

    • Constant revision of the role of foreign companies in the Russian oil and gas sector development, including in offshore projects
    • Prospects of amending the law on foreign investments in strategic sectors
    • Positions of main administrative clans
  • Domestic fuel prices

    • Prospects of cancelation of different models of the oil and gas industry (high taxes in the oil industry – high fuel prices on the domestic market; low taxes in the gas industry – cheap gas for domestic consumers)
    • Political aspects of struggle against monopolization of the Russian fuel market
    • The “eternal” issue of the oil product quality
    • Prospects of transfer to a fundamentally new model of gas pricing
  • Forecast of developments

The contents of the report:

Introduction 2
Chapter 1. Dilemmas of the Oil and Gas Sector Development 6
1.1. OGS Role in Russia’s Economy 6
1.2. Reconsidering OGS Role during the Crisis 12
Chapter 2. Anti-Crisis Taxation Policy in the Oil and Gas Sphere 20
2.1. Minerals Production Tax 20
2.2.  Export Duty 23
2.3. Introduction of Income Added Tax 27
2.4. Taxation Peculiarities in the Gas Sector 28
2.5. Petroleum Product Excises 29
Chapter 3. Measures on Maintaining Production, Condition of Geological Prospecting 33
3.1. Worsened Condition of the Mineral Resources Base 34
3.2. Degradation of the Geological Prospecting Sector 36
3.3. Competition between Old and New Production Provinces 39
3.4. Problems of Developing Russian Offshore Zones 41
Chapter 4. Steps to Develop the Oil Processing Industry 44
4.1. Main Problems of the Oil Processing Sector 44
4.2. Prospects of Reforms in the Oil Processing Industry 46
Chapter 5. Problem of Associated Gas Utilization 52
Chapter 6. Medium-Term State Strategy in the Oil and Gas Sector 59
Date of issue: 21st June 2010

If you are interested to obtain please contact » Elena Kim

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Analytical series “The Fuel and Energy Complex of Russia”:

New OPEC+ Deal and Future of Oil Business in Russia
Gazprom on the background of external and internal challenges
Regulation of Oil and Gas Sector in 2019 and Prospects for 2020
Fiscal Policy on Oil and Gas Sector: Revised as Often as Wikipedia
The tax system in the oil and gas sector continues to undergo radical changes. The beginning of 2019 saw the introduction of a new tax regime: additional income tax. That experiment was supposed to start migration of the oil industry to an innovative principle of taxation: on profit, not revenue. It seemed that a new main road was found. In the same year, however, the Finance Ministry launched an overt offensive against AIT. The fear of loss of government revenue now is more powerful than the threat of causing oil production to collapse in the medium term because of a tax system that does not stimulate investment. The Finance Ministry would strongly prefer to speed up the tax manoeuvre completion that earns the state budget additional money. Oil and gas companies respond to this with individual lobbying, attempting to wangle special treatment for their projects.
Ukrainian Gas Hub: Climax at Hand
The “zero hour” comes in less than a month: the contracts for gas transit through Ukraine and for supplying Russian gas to the country terminate at 10 am on 1 January. Meanwhile, Gazprom and Naftogaz are very far from looking for a mutually acceptable solution. The entire European gas business is watching intently the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Everyone is waiting for a new “gas war”: the January 2009 events proved to be a serious test both to European consumers and to Gazprom as a supplier. Is there still a chance of agreement? If there is not, will Gazprom cope with its obligations to deliver gas to Europe? Is Russia bluffing as it assures that the new infrastructure and gas in underground storage facilities will enable it to get by without Ukrainian transit even as soon as this winter? What will happen to Ukraine itself at the beginning of 2020?

All reports for: 2015 , 14 , 13 , 12 , 11 , 10 , 09 , 08 , 07

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