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State companies vs. private firms: two projects for the sector

State companies vs. private firms: two projects for the sector

The attack on Bashneft again puts the issue of the main direction of the oil sector development on the agenda. Although Rosneft strongly refutes its involvement in the Bashneft case, there are concerns about formation of the “oil industry ministry”.

However, Russian elites should not be perceived as overall adherents of nationalization. In reality, nationalization is not a goal but an instrument. It is used to take away assets from competitors.

However, nationalization would not turn functionaries and top managers of state companies into legal owners and co-owners of assets they manage. This is why nationalization is not the only variant of the sector’s development. No wonder, there are active debates about privatization of Rosneft on the background of expansion policies of the company.

One thing is obvious – the question of property rights is a key one for Russia. It is indicative that re-division of assets is continuing even amid sanctions imposed on Russia when elites seem to be in need of consolidation.

Key topics of the report:

  • Attackers and defenders

    • Who is the main driver of property redistribution? Who is defending its assets?
  • Rosneft’s policy in the sphere of control over assets

    • Stages of expansion of the company; its extensive strategy of development
    • The fate of TNK-BP and Itera
    • The role of Independent Oil and Gas Company (NNK)
    • The fate of Summa
  • Prospects of privatization of state assets

    • Debates about privatization of Rosneft: positions of the management and the government
    • The future of Gazprom Neft
  • Strengthening of the state role in related assets

    • Plans of establishment of a state corporation for geological prospecting and a national servicing company
    • Sanctions as stimuli of the nationalization policy
  • The forecast of medium-term developments

    • The fate of Bashneft, its influence on the sector’s future
    • Possible M&A, prospects of moving from property acquisition to privatization of assets

Contents of the report:

Introduction 3
Chapter 1. Nationalization as instrument for re-dividing assets 5
Chapter 2. Privatization – the other side of nationalization: who benefits? 13
Chapter 3. Intensified re-division of oil and gas market: strategies of attackers and defenders in the oil sector 24
Chapter 4. Privatization in the time of trouble: reliance on state, search for new allies 33
Forecast of developments 42
Date of release: December 23, 2014

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The “zero hour” comes in less than a month: the contracts for gas transit through Ukraine and for supplying Russian gas to the country terminate at 10 am on 1 January. Meanwhile, Gazprom and Naftogaz are very far from looking for a mutually acceptable solution. The entire European gas business is watching intently the negotiations between Russia and Ukraine. Everyone is waiting for a new “gas war”: the January 2009 events proved to be a serious test both to European consumers and to Gazprom as a supplier. Is there still a chance of agreement? If there is not, will Gazprom cope with its obligations to deliver gas to Europe? Is Russia bluffing as it assures that the new infrastructure and gas in underground storage facilities will enable it to get by without Ukrainian transit even as soon as this winter? What will happen to Ukraine itself at the beginning of 2020?

All reports for: 2015 , 14 , 13 , 12 , 11 , 10 , 09 , 08 , 07

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